

The highly biodiverse Selva Lacandona is home to a wide variety of species including jaguar and ocelot. Chiapas, Mexico



climate &
deforestation

redd: the realities in black and white

november 2010



**Friends of
the Earth
International**



Rubber trees on a rubber plantation. Many rubber plantations are being taken over for palm oil. Indonesia; Sumatra 2004

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available for download at <http://www.foei.org/redd-realities>

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summary

When it comes to climate change, REDD is the *couleur du jour*. “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries” holds out the enticing prospect of mitigating climate change, conserving threatened biodiversity, and bringing much-needed development finance to poor Indigenous Peoples and local forest-dwelling communities - at the same time as offering significant profits to investors. All this immediately begs the question: is REDD too good to be true?

The answer, unfortunately, is “yes”. Although REDD may benefit some communities and biodiversity in certain specific areas, overall it is emerging as a mechanism that has the potential to exacerbate inequality, reaping huge rewards for corporate and other large investors whilst bringing considerably fewer benefits -or even serious disadvantages- to Indigenous Peoples and other forest-dependent communities. In addition, if governments focus on REDD in isolation, it could become a dangerous and ineffective distraction from the business of implementing real and effective policies for climate change mitigation and adaptation.

The case studies in this report clearly show there is a major REDD race already underway. They also show that REDD projects vary significantly, depending on the country of implementation and the objectives of the project sponsors. Although some projects are more thoughtfully designed, others are clearly focused on maximising returns.

Even in the best-case scenario, however, it seems Indigenous Peoples must work extremely hard to make themselves heard or to benefit from REDD on an equitable basis. Furthermore, civil society organisations deemed critical of REDD are often excluded from consultations, and their previous inputs are ignored. In addition, some investors are obviously trying to hurry the deal-making process along as rapidly as possible, even if it means exerting undue pressure on negotiating partners or skipping parts of already-agreed processes, such as consultation.

One of the clearest conclusions is that large transnational corporations, especially those involved in the energy sector or energy-intensive industries, are rapidly honing in on REDD because it offers them – perhaps more than any other participant – a true “win-win” opportunity. Through REDD they are able to restyle themselves as climate change champions even as they continue, or even expand, operations to extract fossil fuels. At the same time they stand to profit from REDD to the tune of literally hundreds of millions of dollars.

In many countries there is also ongoing uncertainty about land tenure and carbon rights, and in some it seems that REDD is muddying these particular waters even further. Overall there remains a significant risk that REDD will result in the privatisation of the world’s forest resources, transferring them

out of the hands of Indigenous Peoples and local communities, and into the hands of bankers and carbon traders.

There is also an emerging debate about whether REDD can really work at the project level; and doubts about the complexity and advisability of applying it at the national level as well. Unless demand for agricultural commodities and timber declines, REDD may not work on a project-by-project basis, since deforesting activities may simply shift elsewhere. Yet national-level REDD could imply that all those engaged in forest-damaging activities should be compensated, whether they are communities and subsistence farmers struggling to sustain their livelihoods, or logging and palm oil companies anxious to tap into a convenient new income stream.

If REDD is also linked to carbon markets, an expanded national-level REDD would further multiply the risks of relying on the vagaries of carbon markets and prices. This could bring REDD grinding to a halt and cause domestic economic difficulties.

Finally, these case studies show that REDD pilot projects and REDD-related legislation encompassing monoculture tree plantations and “sustainable forest management” (SFM, i.e., continued logging) are already underway; many of these also assume or create links between REDD and carbon markets. Yet REDD has not yet been agreed within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This raises two further questions: will the existence of current REDD projects be allowed to define the parameters of any future REDD agreement in the UNFCCC? And will governments give the go ahead to a form of REDD that can be used by logging companies to replace old-growth natural forests with serried ranks of quick-growing, low-carbon trees?

REDD as currently being negotiated has a weak ambition of “reducing emissions” from deforestation, and includes continued logging and plantation operations, all financed by volatile carbon markets. This is not the robust, equitable and definitive approach needed in these uncertain times. It is important to note that many of the problems outlined in this report are even evident in those REDD projects that are applying to, or have already been accredited by, the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA).

If governments are to succeed in mitigating climate change by addressing deforestation, they must agree to an equitable mechanism that actually aims to stop deforestation. This will require reducing demand for agricultural and timber products, and addressing other underlying causes of deforestation. Such a mechanism should reward those that have already conserved their forests. It should build on the experiences of Indigenous Peoples and communities around the world, who already know how to manage and benefit from forests sustainably. There are many lessons waiting to be learned.

one what is redd?

REDD stands for “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries”¹ and is currently being negotiated within the UNFCCC. Although not yet agreed, REDD is already generating considerable momentum in the “real” world outside the halls of negotiation. In fact, many negotiators probably consider it one of the more successful aspects of the UNFCCC talks (which are generally characterised by political foot-dragging and intransigence).

However, there are many reasons to be extremely cautious about REDD. They include ethical concerns, methodological constraints and a potentially blinkered approach as to how REDD is developing in reality. Nevertheless, REDD “readiness” projects are springing up across the world, even though REDD’s scope and exact nature have yet to be agreed. The danger is that, as REDD takes shape in the real world, this will constrain governments’ decisions about its fundamental nature and parameters.


REDD is often framed as being rooted in an important real-world fact that must be addressed: rapid deforestation is now known to be responsible for some 18% of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions emitted globally every year (more than caused by all forms of transport combined). REDD is intended to create a system of positive financial incentives that will cause those engaged in deforestation or forest degradation to switch to less damaging activities.

But the details have not yet been hammered out. In particular, there is ongoing debate in the UNFCCC about whether REDD should or should not include plantations, and whether it should be financed through public funding or via private funds leveraged through carbon markets. Almost all current government proposals suggest linking deforestation to the carbon market. Yet this would allow rich industrialised countries to offset their emissions rather than make real reductions, completely undermining any stated goals to tackle climate change through REDD. Critically, REDD will also contribute to the progressive privatisation of the world’s natural resources. Furthermore, it could be used to reward dirty energy and logging companies.

REDD was initially proposed in 2005 by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica on behalf of countries participating in the Coalition for Rainforest Nations. This coalition of developing countries with tropical forests supports the exchange of carbon emissions reductions for access to international markets for emissions trading.² Both Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica are proactive proponents of using market mechanisms to leverage private finance, and Costa Rica is well known for its early introduction of a “Payments for Environmental Services” (PES) scheme.

However, this position is not shared by all developing countries. It should also be noted that Costa Rica’s PES scheme, supported and promoted by the World Bank, is not quite the poster child for market mechanisms many believe it to be (see case study).

The hasty roll-out of REDD is underpinned by the expectation of substantial profits. There have been numerous different calculations, but a North-South flow of somewhere in the region of US\$30 billion per year has been predicted (UN-REDD, 2010). This is clearly a motivating factor for many developing countries disappointed by and increasingly cynical about industrialised countries’ entrenched resistance to transferring funds for development and climate change (FoEI, 2008). However, the case studies in this report show that these projects are also attracting a panoply of different agents to REDD, including carbon traders, big international conservation non-governmental organisations (NGOs), plantation companies and even oil and gas companies seeking an attractive and topical green veneer for their activities.



Valdivian Temperate Rain Forest. Native Forests of Southern Chile

photo Claudio Donoso Hiriart - Chile

1 It is more fully understood to encompass both deforestation and forest degradation; see definition in Decision 2/CP.13 (UNFCCC, 2007).

2 For a more detailed account of the history of REDD, see REDD Myths (FoEI, 2008).

one what is redd?

payments for environmental services in costa rica: promoting a myth

Costa Rica is well known for its pioneering role in developing a PES scheme, and in promoting REDD within the UNFCCC. The Costa Rica government is currently preparing a REDD Readiness Plan (R-PP) to submit to the World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), which is based on the country's PES scheme.

However, Costa Rica's PES scheme is not what it seems. Rather than being a market mechanism financed solely by the sale of environmental services, 90% of the finance generated over the last 15 years came from a national tax on fuel consumption. Costa Rica has successfully reduced its deforestation rate, but this is largely due to the abandonment of large livestock farms, as increasing land prices reduced the profitability of beef farming (Holman *et al.*, 2008). A 1996 forest law also prohibited any change of use for forested lands. In reality, the impact of PES has been minimal.

Furthermore, managing the PES scheme costs 25% of the Ministry of the Environment's budget. This means PES has in fact been a very expensive tool, using resources that could otherwise be invested to improve control over protected areas and forest activities. In addition, PES funds are often used ineffectively. For example, very little has been used to purchase land inside

Indigenous Peoples' territories from non-indigenous owners, even though considerable sums have actually been allocated to those same territories (FoE Costa Rica, 2009). Moreover, PES has not resulted in reduced poverty in rural zones.

Source: Friends of the Earth Costa Rica / Coecoceiba



photo Simon Rawles/Friends of the Earth

Iwokrama has a sustainable timber harvesting operation that has received certification by FSC. Only a small percentage of the forest is harvested and the operation is strictly controlled. Guyana

two unfccc concern over redd...

Although REDD negotiations are moving ahead relatively quickly compared to other, almost deadlocked topics within the UNFCCC, they are still not moving fast enough for those interested in engaging in REDD. As a result, REDD deals and projects are now proliferating in different countries around the world under the guise of “preparing” for REDD. Negotiators of many of these projects anticipate a REDD deal will be struck sometime soon, and expect the value of their REDD credits to increase sharply as a result. Yet some sticky issues still need to be resolved.

UNFCCC negotiations currently focus on a derivative of REDD referred to as “REDD+”. Although the precise definition of this term has yet to be formally agreed³ it is generally taken to include “*positive incentives for the conservation of forests, sustainable forest management, and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries*” (UNFCCC, 2007:1[b][iii]).

This seemingly innocuous language is loaded with meaning. It effectively brings many more interested parties to REDD. These include countries already conserving their forests that have low levels of deforestation, and timber and agribusiness companies (including oil palm plantation companies). Interested parties could even include proponents of plantations of genetically modified trees (if, for example, these were designed to grow faster, absorb more carbon, or have lower levels of lignin so they could be processed into biofuels more easily).

Disagreements about REDD are reflected most clearly in the debate taking place within the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA). Here key differences still remain and some countries, including Bolivia and Saudi Arabia, recently proposed new language changes (FIELD, 2010).⁴ These demonstrate that there is still a sharp difference of opinion about whether REDD+ should:

- prohibit the use of REDD funds to finance industrial logging or the conversion of forests to plantations
- exclude market mechanisms and the use of offsetting by industrialised countries
- be about reducing “emissions from deforestation”, or about deforestation itself (an important nuance, since it is possible to reduce such emissions *without* reducing deforestation)
- include a long-term goal of reducing deforestation globally by a certain percentage
- be implemented on the national level only, or also include sub-national projects, and
- include guiding principles on environmental integrity and the rights of Indigenous Peoples (FIELD, 2010).

REDD-related issues are also being discussed by the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP), which deals with rich Annex I country⁵ commitments. Topics here include possible amendments to existing rules on Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF). These changes could cover the management of forests, croplands, wetlands and soil carbon. However, the Central African Forests Commission (COMIFAC)⁶ has objected to a potential scenario that could develop as a result. That is, whereas developed countries might be allowed to replace existing forests with plantations (under LULUCF), developing countries would not (under REDD). On the other hand, if the two sets of rules were harmonised, as discussed in the AWG-KP (Martone, 2010), this could increase pressure to include plantation forestry in REDD.

Other outstanding issues include Indigenous Peoples’ engagement in the monitoring, reporting and verification of REDD, and whether guidance on the drivers of deforestation should be developed.⁷

“Scaling up” climate finance from both public and private sources is also undergoing general consideration by the High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing (AGF; Martone, 2010). However, serious concerns have been raised about the direction and focus of the AGF, which appears to take the controversial Copenhagen Accord, promoted by the US and not agreed within the UNFCCC, as its starting point.

The Copenhagen Accord aims to mobilise US\$100 billion from public and private sources, but this is far short of what is required. The AGF also seems to be poised to marginalise the role of public finance in favour of support for carbon markets, which are volatile and vulnerable to fraud. It also favours the World Bank and other multilateral development banks as managers of climate finance, a prospect that developing countries have repeatedly opposed in the UNFCCC (CJN, 2010).

³ One reason for ongoing debate is a recent proposal to remove the words “emissions of” from the definition of REDD itself (FIELD, 2010).

⁴ The resulting draft text, which will be considered in Tianjin, China is available at unfccc.int/documentation/documents/advanced_search/items/3594.php?rec=j&preref=600005941#beg (courtesy of FIELD). Chapter VI contains the text on REDD+ (with two options).

⁵ Annex I Parties are industrialised countries committed to greenhouse gas reductions.

⁶ The Central African Forests Commission (COMIFAC) is the primary authority for decision-making and coordination of sub-regional actions and initiatives pertaining to the conservation and sustainable management of the Congo Basin forests: carpe.umd.edu/Plone/how-carpe-works/comifac/.

⁷ These are being discussed in the UNFCCC’s SBSTA (Martone, 2010).

two unfccc concern over redd...

mexico champions redd, but proarbol indicates uncertain future

Mexico will host the 16th Conference of the Parties to UNFCCC (COP-16) in Cancun, at the end of 2010. According to information and statements by various Mexican authorities, REDD will be a key issue on the COP-16 agenda. This host nation is determined that the COP will successfully agree to REDD and the Green Fund for climate change finance originally proposed by Mexico (which might also incorporate REDD). In September 2010, the Secretary of the Environment and Natural Resources, Juan Rafael Elvira Quesada, called on the representatives of the 40 countries involved in REDD to commit to drafting a document to contribute to COP-16 discussions. The call was made just before the *“Workshop on Forest Governance, Decentralization and REDD+ in Latin America and the Caribbean”* which took place in Oaxaca, Mexico between 31 August and 3 September, 2010 and was co-organised by Mexico and Switzerland.

Mexico is also planning its own engagement in REDD. Secretary Quesada has said that Mexico is already negotiating with Norway to implement programs. However, similar PES schemes in Mexico have been far from successful, indicating the possibility of significant negative impacts if REDD is implemented in the same way.

ProArbol is a case in point. Largely funded through a PES scheme, ProArbol is a federal programme dedicated to supporting the forest sector. It focuses on the conservation and restoration of forests, jungles and vegetation in arid and semi-arid areas of Mexico. However, in 2009 research by El Universal newspaper concluded that, two years after its creation, ProArbol had not been successful. More than half of vegetation planted consisted of cacti, and 90% of the trees planted in 2007 had died.

The programme has also reportedly been eroded by corruption. In 2008, the Auditoría Superior de Fiscalización conducted three audits of the Comisión Nacional Forestal in Chiapas after a series of denunciations concerning the diversion of resources, including into electoral campaigns. Cuarto Poder newspaper stated early this year that, *“in 2008, there were concerns in Chiapas about the management of 18,327,444 pesos,”* but nobody was accused and no investigation was carried out. In addition, *“most of the seedlings were not planted, and what was planted was lost.”*

Many PES experiences in Mexico are presented as great successes to the world, such as the Sierra Gorda Biosphere Reserve in Queretaro and Scolel Te in Chiapas. Yet according to

advisors on REDD, *“it is important to include all lessons learned in the different PES schemes for the development of REDD proposals. While the experiences have been successful in some cases, in others they did not have a noticeable impact on deforestation rates, on the conservation of a specific environmental service (water, carbon, biodiversity), or on the quality of life of local communities.”*

Indigenous communities in Chiapas have also been criminalised, often following complaints from environmental organisations such as Pronatura Mexico and Conservation International Mexico.

During fieldwork, Friends of the Earth Mexico / Otros Mundos has come across some of the dangers that these market mechanisms entail for Indigenous and peasant communities and forests. Forests are now a highly valued good, and Indigenous Peoples are increasingly blamed for deforestation and climate change, especially in the media. There have been planned relocations and violent displacements near Montes Azules Reserve and the Lacandona Jungle. The communities assert that they have always taken care of forests, since they need them to obtain food, firewood and natural medicines, and that the problem of climate change is caused by industrial societies. Their concern is that rural populations are now going to experience the consequences. Friends of the Earth Mexico / Otros Mundos believes that the Chiapas state authorities and the federal government are using climate change as an excuse to implement public policies which are not widely accepted by society.

As a result of all these shortcomings, peasant communities in Mexico do not trust the agrarian and forest authorities, and so far there is no adequately developed and verified national framework for the introduction of REDD.

Source: Friends of the Earth Mexico / Otros Mundos AC / Chiapas



Selva Lacandona in Chiapas, Mexico

photo Jessica Ciacci - Chiapas

three ... but redd is taking shape anyway

Outside the negotiating halls, REDD is already gathering speed – to the extent of creating a distinct risk that the shape REDD is taking on the ground will determine what governments will or will not agree within the UNFCCC.

The situation is also chaotic, with many different multilateral institutions and national donor countries and bilateral funds involved. As a result of this disjointed situation, information about REDD tends to be scattered. However, the new Interim REDD+ Partnership Agreement (see below) has begun to collate information, publishing its first “Synthesis Report”, and individual country and institutional reports in May 2010 (REDD+ Synthesis Report, 2010).⁸

The report makes it clear that the REDD activities being funded are many and varied. Some are focused on a range of REDD readiness

activities such as planning and consultation processes, and assessing the current state of forests. However, “demonstration activities” and “performance-based payments” already account for 30% of the funds being spent (REDD+ Synthesis Report, 2010:9). In other words, REDD is already happening.



Amazon fires

world bank: forest carbon partnership facility

The World Bank was the first to enter the REDD fray. It launched its Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) in 2007, which is intended to help countries “get ready” for REDD and establish some pilot REDD projects.

The Bank was and remains intent on taking the lead on climate finance and advancing the role of carbon markets. Many Annex I countries would also prefer to see the World Bank manage their contributions, since they have more control over what might be done with those funds due to the Bank’s donor-oriented “one-dollar-one-vote” governance structure.⁹ There are reports that the FCPF is currently focused on how to become the “*overarching coordinating entity of all REDD readiness implementing agencies*,” with the World Bank’s new Forest Investment Programme (FIP) striving to attain the same status with respect to REDD implementation (Martone, 2010).

In total 37 countries have applied and been selected¹⁰ (although the engagement of four countries -Chile, El Salvador, Papua New Guinea and Paraguay- seems to have come to a halt, at least according to the FCPF “Dashboard”).¹¹ Funding has been committed and/or pledged by Norway, Germany, Netherlands, Japan, Australia, Finland, Switzerland, Spain, Denmark, France, UK and USA. It totalled US\$130 million in June 2009 and US\$151.8 million in June 2010 (World Bank, 2010). As of June 2010, only 10% -US\$12,955,000- had actually been spent (REDD+ Synthesis Report, 2010).

The Bank’s involvement in climate change negotiations has been much criticised by civil society.¹² Perhaps as a result of this, the FCPF is now more open to participation from observers, including representatives of civil society and Indigenous Peoples (REDD+ Synthesis Report, 2010). It should also be the case that a number of safeguards apply, including the application of the principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent, and measures to safeguard the rights of Indigenous Peoples. Furthermore, the World Bank’s accountability mechanisms should apply, including its Operational Policy (OP) on environmental evaluations (OP 4.01), Indigenous Peoples (OP 4.1), physical cultural resources (OP 4.11), and involuntary resettlement (OP 4.12) (GFC, unpublished). However, it is possible that these safeguards may be contested by one or more REDD participants.

⁸ A list of and updates about a wide range of climate funds, including forest carbon funds, can also be found here: www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing.

⁹ For more detail see: www.bicusa.org/en/Institution.Structure.5.aspx

¹⁰ Argentina, Bolivia, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of Congo, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Liberia, Madagascar, Mexico, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Republic of Congo, Suriname, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, Vanuatu, and Vietnam.

¹¹ For more information and further national updates check the World Bank’s ‘FCPF Dashboard’ at www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/node/283

¹² An ongoing debate, see www.foei.org/en/get-involved/take-action/call-for-world-bank-to-stay-out-of-un-climate-negotiations

three ... but redd is taking shape anyway

world bank: forest investment programme

The relatively new World Bank FIP, which is part of the Bank's Strategic Climate Fund, is supported with funds from Australia, Denmark, Japan, Norway, UK and the USA. It focuses on the implementation of REDD, with eight pilot countries – Brazil, Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mexico and Peru – selected to receive support, "with a clear focus on investments that will initiate transformational changes in the forest sector and those sectors affecting forests" (REDD+ Synthesis Report, 2010).¹³

It has pledged funds of just over US\$560 million, none of which had been allocated by August 2010 (and some of which are contingent upon the performance of the fund). Importantly, this represents an average of US\$70 million for each of the eight pilot countries. This is significantly more than the US\$227 million pledged to the FCPF¹⁴ which, when divided among 37 countries, averages slightly more than US\$6 million per nation (REDD+ Synthesis Report, 2010).

The FIP, which is partly a lending facility, has a broader agenda than the FCPF: it provides "up-front bridge financing". This includes funding to help countries "contribute to multiple benefits such as biodiversity conservation, protection of the rights

of indigenous peoples and local communities, poverty reduction and rural livelihoods enhancements" (REDD+ Synthesis Report, 2010: FIP contribution). It aims, among other things, to address the underlying causes of deforestation and forest degradation, facilitate scaled-up private investment in alternative livelihoods for forest-dependent communities, and improve forest law enforcement and governance (FIP contribution to: REDD+ Synthesis Report, 2010). The FIP has also established a dedicated grant mechanism for Indigenous Peoples and local communities (REDD+ Synthesis Report, 2010: UK contribution).

However, concerns have been raised about how participating countries have been selected. There is also concern as to whether FIP can really deliver anything other than business-as-usual, especially if funds are disbursed prematurely before countries truly have the capacity to deal with REDD. Furthermore, it is extremely troubling that civil society recommendations for inclusion of specific criteria concerning compliance with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), and a requirement for the Free, Prior and Informed Consent of affected Indigenous Peoples, have been rejected (BWP, 2010).

un-redd

The United Nations Collaborative Programme on REDD (UN-REDD) also aims to help countries to prepare for REDD. Its project objectives include quantifying carbon stored in forests, and property and forest tenure issues.



Children from the Makushi tribe playing, Iwokrama Forest, Guyana

photo Simon Rawles/Friends of the Earth

In terms of finance, it is smaller than the World Bank's FCPF and FIP, with projected expenditure for the fast-start period of 2010-2012 standing at US\$49,501,658 in May 2010 (REDD+ Synthesis Report, 2010:15). UN-REDD is currently funding REDD readiness projects in Bolivia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Tanzania, Vietnam and Zambia.

¹³ For more information go to: www.climatefundupdate.org/listing/forest-investment-program and www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/node/5

¹⁴ See: www.un.org/esa/forests/pdf/aheg/aheg1/UN-REDD-Vahanen.pdf

bilateral redd finance¹⁵

There is also a plethora of bilateral and private REDD funds and projects, including the Amazon Fund, the Congo Basin Forest Fund (Norway and UK), and bilateral initiatives by Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the UK, Conservation International and the Wildlife Conservation Society.¹⁶

Among the most notable is Norway's Climate and Forest Initiative, weighing in at a hefty US\$440 million per year over several years. Of this up to US\$1 billion has been committed to Indonesia, and a further US\$1 billion to the Amazon Fund (a fund established by Brazil's government-run National Economic and Social Development Bank). Finance is also being channelled to the Congo Basin Fund, UN-REDD, REDD projects in Guyana, Mexico and Tanzania, and some civil society activities (Norway, 2010).

Norway's collaboration with Indonesia, formalised in May 2010, may be instructive as to the difficulties inherent in ensuring REDD funds are not simply usurped by logging and

plantation companies. The deal is supposed to include a "two-year suspension on all new concessions for conversion of peat and natural forest" and funds are not intended to be used for reforestation (Norway, 2010b). But it seems that the Indonesian government may be back-tracking, possibly because of intense lobbying by industrial interests, which are no doubt anxious to ensure that they are not excluded from REDD. The promised future moratorium seems to be shrinking: as of August 2010 an Indonesian official claimed it should cover just 50% of the forest area to begin with (Reuters, 2010). It has also been reported that Indonesia wants to renegotiate the contract to include reforestation (Jakarta Post, 2010). Bilateral negotiations on how the moratorium should be implemented are ongoing.

¹⁵ For more comprehensive information about bilateral REDD+ finance go to Synthesis Report (2010).

¹⁶ See REDD+ Synthesis Report, 2010:6-7 for details.



photo Rolando Diaz

Pine tree plantation in the municipality of Tolten, Southern Chile

three ... but redd is taking shape anyway

new interim redd+ partnership agreement

There is also a strong possibility that the slow pace of official UNFCCC negotiations will simply be side-stepped by countries keen to move ahead as soon as possible. This certainly seems to be the purpose of the new Interim REDD+ Partnership Agreement, initiated by Norway and France and launched at the Oslo Climate and Forest Conference on 27 May 2010.

This partnership aims to provide a “voluntary, non-legally binding framework... within which the Partners may develop and implement collaborative REDD+ efforts” (Norway, 2010c). The partnership’s founding documents do state that it will support and contribute to, rather than prejudice, the UNFCCC process, and that it would be “replaced by a future UNFCCC mechanism including REDD+” (Norway, 2010c). But it is also clear that the Partnership will in the meantime allow “Partners to scale up REDD+ actions and finance, and to that end to take immediate action, including improving the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency and coordination of REDD+ initiatives and financial instruments” (Norway, 2010c).

In other words, the Partnership could effectively become “a process outside of the UNFCCC where REDD-related activities will be shared, and consensus will be hammered out on various critical issues that are still pending in the negotiations” (Martone, 2010).

Arguably, the existence of the Partnership will also remove, or at least reduce, the need for participating countries to compromise in order to reach a REDD deal within the UNFCCC. It could also act as a precedent for dealing with other contentious issues currently deadlocked within the UNFCCC (Martone, 2010). It thus threatens to undermine the UN’s democratic processes.

The Partnership initially developed very rapidly, but lately it has become bogged down in sharp differences over organisational matters and rules of engagement with civil society and Indigenous Peoples’ representatives. By September 2010, 68 countries were registered as partner countries¹⁷ (Norway, 2010c). It is currently co-chaired by Japan and Papua New Guinea.

The Partnership has also been sharply criticised for its failure to include civil society and Indigenous Peoples in its design and development. Stakeholders have been effectively excluded from recent meetings, sometimes because those meetings were closed, sometimes because invitations were issued so late as to make travel arrangements impossible.¹⁸ The criticism has led to strong disagreement among participating countries about the level of inclusiveness and transparency of the Partnership.

The Partnership’s founding document also makes no mention of Indigenous Peoples’ rights (although it does refer to their engagement in REDD-related processes). Concerns about this omission have been met with evasive responses (Martone, 2010).



Digger clears rainforest in order to make way for a palm oil plantation, Indonesia



Clear cut logging of native forest, Mawuidanche mountain range, municipality of Loncoche, Southern Chile

¹⁷ For the list of countries go to reddpluspartnership.org/65230/en/.

¹⁸ For more details and to read a civil society submission to the Interim REDD+ Partnership go to www.fern.org/node/4824 and www.fern.org/node/4821.

voluntary carbon markets

REDD is not currently included in the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism, but there is an ongoing debate in the UNFCCC about whether REDD should be funded through "compliance" carbon markets. There are many reasons why not, including concerns about the privatisation of natural resources, the volatility and unpredictability of markets generally, and the increased potential for corruption.

However, many REDD projects are currently being developed on the basis that they can still sell REDD-generated carbon credits to voluntary carbon markets until REDD is agreed in the UNFCCC. Once this transpires, vendors will aim to sell to the compliance markets then established, on the basis that profits will be higher (see the Ulu Masen case study, for example) (EcoSecurities, 2007).

The much smaller voluntary markets are separate from the Kyoto Protocol-backed "compliance" trading mechanisms. They provide a place for offset purchases by private buyers, such as individuals or companies wanting to improve their carbon footprint. These voluntary markets have been purchasing credits from initiatives like avoided deforestation projects since the early 1990s (EcoSecurities, 2007).¹⁹

Iwokrama has a sustainable timber harvesting operation that has received certification by FSC. Only a small percentage of the forest is harvested and the operation is strictly controlled. Guyana



photo Simon Rawles/Friends of the Earth

¹⁹ For more information go to: www.green-markets.org/voluntary.htm.

four why so fast? bankrolling redd for profits and greenwash

REDD has been promoted as a mechanism that could channel tens of billions of dollars per year to those who reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. The Ulu Masen project in Indonesia (see case study), for example, aims to generate up to US\$432 million over the next 30 years (Asian Green Governors' Roundtable, 2009).

Although who will and who will not benefit under any UNFCCC-endorsed REDD agreement has still not been agreed, it is obvious that many different countries, companies and communities are under the impression they might reap a share of its promised rewards. This has injected a momentum into the REDD process not evident in other UNFCCC deliberations.

However, the potential for significant profits has also brought heavyweight players to the scene, potentially to the disadvantage of other participants. These big players have

more capital, expertise and influence, and can thus skew REDD development in general, and REDD project design in particular, in their favour. Some projects, such as Rimba Raya in Indonesia, are now being explicitly described by their sponsors as "for profit" projects.

Of particular note is the fact that some of the world's largest energy companies are engaging in forest carbon projects. There are numerous examples detailed in this report, including Shell (Rimba Raya, Indonesia); BP, American Electric Power and Pacificorp (Noel Kempff Mercado, Bolivia); and General Motors, Chevron Texaco and American Electric Power (Guaraqueçaba, Brazil). Similarly, Shire Pacific Offshore, an investor in the Paraguay Forest Conservation Project, owns and operates vessels that support the offshore oil and gas industry, and its parent company is the largest shareholder of the Cathay Pacific airline.

oil and gas companies in latin america

Aware of the many conflicts that oil extraction generates, companies are keen to demonstrate their willingness to compensate for the damage they have caused. The REDD strategy comes in very handy: it facilitates this "greenwashing" and even allows profit to be made from it. It also allows these companies to continue expanding their oil exploration and exploitation frontiers.

BP, for example, has been extracting oil from the foothills of the Casanare department in Colombia since the 1990s, destroying forests and important water resources in the process. This is one of many oil projects in ancestral communities and territories highly valued for their biodiversity.²⁰ However, BP's participation in the 14-year old Noel Kempff Mercado Climate Action Project in Bolivia, promoted as a model for REDD, could end up legitimising and rendering acceptable all the havoc the company has wreaked elsewhere. This project, also supported by power companies American Electric Power and Pacificorp, has been roundly criticised because it is not clear exactly how much it benefits the climate. Estimated figures for claimed reductions in greenhouse gas emissions have plummeted over the years. Leakage from the project is thought to be much higher than originally projected (between 42% and 60%, rather than 15%). Furthermore, it may have little impact given Bolivia had already introduced a Forestry Law in 1996 that reduced the area of land under concessions by 75% anyway (Greenpeace, 2009).

Another example of simultaneous investment in REDD and fossil fuels is taking shape in the Brazilian Amazon (although this case involves a direct donation rather than anticipated purchase of carbon credits). The Norwegian government is the main donor to the Amazon Fund, and Norway is thus regarded as a leading champion of REDD (FoE Brazil, 2010). However, the Norwegian government has signed a deal between the Norwegian government-owned oil company Statoil and the Brazilian oil giant Petrobras, on deepwater oil prospecting. The Norwegian Prime Minister even signed the two deals on the same visit to Brazil.

Norwegian investments are also flowing into bauxite mining and aluminium production in the Amazon. Norwegian company Norsk Hydro ASA recently signed an agreement to take control of Vale do Rio Doce's aluminium businesses in Brazil. This agreement grants control of mines and refineries to the Norwegian company. The company will also benefit from a supply of cheap electricity from the planned Belo Monte Hydroelectric Dam, which will flood hundreds of square kilometres of tropical rainforest, threatening the survival of the Xingu River Indigenous Peoples.

Source: Cardona & Avendaño (2010)

²⁰ For Oilwatch's map of hydrocarbon activities in protected areas in Asia, America and Africa, go to: www.oilwatch.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=48&Itemid=94&lang=es.

Companies in the oil sector are not the only ones seeking to use REDD to greenwash their image and avoid emissions reductions. Timber companies and interests, for example, are also increasingly active. The International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), an inter-governmental institution for countries engaged in producing and consuming wood from tropical forests, has already launched its Thematic Programme on REDD and Enhancing Environmental Services in Tropical Forests.²¹ ITTO also participates in the Collaborative Partnership on Forests that will “collaborate” with the UN-REDD Program.²² But the ITTO clearly has the timber industry’s interests at heart and has been lobbying the UNFCCC negotiations to include “sustainable forest management” (which includes logging) and “production forests” (monoculture plantations) in REDD (ITTO, 2009).

At the same time, the ITTO is also providing funding for protected areas of up to 2.9 million hectares (ITTO, 2002),²³ some of which are already known as REDD prototypes, including the Iwokrama Forest in Guyana (REDD Monitor, 2010). The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) is also seeking to expand its certification scheme to include REDD (FSC, 2010).

Mining companies are also engaging in REDD. Rio Tinto for example, a mining company that is well-known for human rights violations and environmental destruction (ILWU, 2010), is promoting REDD as “an economic tool to offset Rio Tinto’s carbon footprint.”²⁴

For large conservation organisations such as The Nature Conservancy, Flora and Fauna International and Conservation International, business also seems to be booming. These organisations are engaged in developing and managing many new REDD projects, and are often, as the case studies in this report show, to be found participating in national dialogues that exclude local communities and organisations – especially those that might be critical of REDD.

Carbon finance consultants also seem set for a boom period. McKinsey, for example, charged Papua New Guinea US\$2.2 million for four months of consultancy work on REDD, adaptation and climate change planning. And this was just for the first phase of a continuing project (McKinsey, 2009).

shell and gazprom in rimba raya, indonesia

Oil giant Shell, infamous for its association with the murder of Ogoni People and environmental destruction in Nigeria’s Niger Delta, is already rushing into REDD.²⁵ Shell, Russian gas company Gazprom and the Clinton Foundation are investing in the landmark REDD Rimba Raya project, on 100,000 hectares of tropical peat swamp forest in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia. The Rimba Raya carbon offset project is likely to be quite a money-maker (FoE Nigeria & IEN, 2010). The project is expected to prevent 75 million tonnes of CO₂ (carbon dioxide) from being emitted over 30 years. At US\$10 per tonne of CO₂, this would generate US\$750 million (Reuters, 2010b).

Generally, it is uncertain whether Indigenous Peoples and local communities will receive a share of any of the profits made by REDD projects. The Rimba Raya project documents suggest that even potential CCBA-accredited projects may be less than ideal in this respect. Rimba Raya is explicitly promoted as a “for profit” REDD project. Furthermore, whilst it does focus on providing health, education and livelihoods benefits to the local communities, it is not clear whether any of the finance generated will actually accrue directly to the communities themselves. The project documentation states that a US\$25 million dollar endowment will be established to promote a range of community benefits on a permanent basis (Rimba Raya PDD, 2010). This leaves a potential profit of something in the region of US\$725 million for the project’s investors.

21 See International Tropical Timber Organization, ITTO Thematic Programme on Reducing Deforestation and Forest Degradation and Enhancing Environmental Services in Tropical Forests (REDDES) www.itto.int/files/user/TPD_ITTO_REDES_E_public.pdf and www.itto.int/en/thematic_programme_general/.

22 For more information go to UN-REDD Programme – Partnerships, www.un-redd.org/AboutUNREDDProgramme/Partnerships/tabid/1056/language/en-US/Default.aspx.

23 The 2.9 million hectare reserve is located in the Tambopata-Madidi region along the Peru-Bolivia border. Another ITTO-financed protected area is the 2.4 million hectare mega-reserve in the Condor mountains along the Peru-Ecuador border, which is managed by Conservation International. www.itto.int/direct/topics/topics_pdf_download/topics_id=3630000&no=1&disp=inline

24 IUCN – Rio Tinto Facilitated Workshop Summary cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/workshop_summary.pdf
Also see “The Financial Costs of REDD: Evidence from Brazil and Indonesia” funded by Rio Tinto: cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/costs_of_redd_summary_brochure.pdf

25 For more information see www.foei.org/en/what-we-do/corporate-power/global/archive/2009/shell-forced-to-settle-out-of-court.

five indigenous peoples and other forest-dependent communities struggle to be heard

Ensuring that Indigenous Peoples' and local communities' voices are heard during the scramble to set up REDD projects has been and remains an uphill struggle, both at the national and international levels.

The International Indigenous Peoples' Forum on Climate Change has reiterated its call for the inclusion of strong and explicit references to the rights of Indigenous Peoples. This includes the resolution of land tenure, carbon rights, and the right to self-determination and Free, Prior and Informed Consent. It also includes compliance with UNDRIP as a precondition for any REDD+ project in indigenous lands.

However, it seems that the UNFCCC (in negotiations in the AWG-LCA) may fail to explicitly recognise the need to "implement" as well as "support and promote" strong social, environmental and human rights safeguards. This would result in weak text that could be more easily manipulated by companies and governments, enabling them to access REDD financing without implementing safeguards.

These seemingly arcane battles over linguistic nuances reflect very real REDD-related disputes now unfolding on the ground. In most cases examined in this report, Indigenous People and others are struggling to engage in consultations and other relevant processes, even though their involvement in REDD, and the potential gains to be had from it, have been widely promoted. Respect for and compliance with Indigenous Peoples' rights also seems to be a missing element in many cases. There is also an over-riding concern about impacts on Indigenous Peoples' societies and cultures in general.



'Forests Day' meeting, and environmental education activity in the forest, from the perspective of the Mapuche culture, "lof epurewe" community, municipality of Loncoche, Southern Chile

"REDD, just like carbon trading and the Clean Development Mechanism, has money as its main focus, when in fact we are talking about a common good, without owners and for the benefit of all people. In addition to the clear risks of corruption it implies, this commodification of forest resources clashes with the worldview of indigenous cultures by imposing a neoliberal trade culture on them."

Source: Friends of the Earth Mexico / Otros Mundos

Paraguay is perhaps the most hopeful example from the case studies examined in this report. The newly installed left-wing government is committed to ensuring Indigenous Peoples' concerns are addressed, and the Coordinadora para la Autonomia de Pueblos Indigenas (CAPI) is now participating in the technical team discussing REDD with UN-REDD (see Paraguay case study). It is also worth noting that the Democratic Republic of Congo has set up a national REDD committee with equal participation from government and civil society.

In Indonesia's Ulu Masen, however, a much-publicised participatory approach that looked good on paper has effectively been skipped. Proper community consultation and involvement in the project's design and implementation have been overlooked, seemingly to expedite the project. Another example is to be found in Guyana. There the government has established a supposedly inclusive consultation process that is, in effect, marginalising stakeholders who take a more critical stance towards the government's plans.

Similarly, the private Paraguay Forest Conservation Project's backers are surprisingly explicit about their intention to make sure that the project proceeds rapidly, without being delayed by time-consuming consultation processes with Indigenous Peoples. Curiously, they do not seem to view this as an impediment to acquiring accreditation from the Climate Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA). This project has been strongly criticised by civil society organisations for failure to respect the *de facto* lack of consent that should be accorded to Indigenous Peoples living in isolation.

paraguay: ensuring indigenous peoples' voices are heard

In August 2008, the right-wing Colorado Party's sixty-year grip on power in Paraguay came to a peaceful end, when former Catholic bishop Fernando Armindo Lugo - known as the "Bishop of the Poor" - was sworn in as president. Lugo is committed to giving land to the landless, fighting corruption and supporting the rights and concerns of Indigenous Peoples. The government has thus taken a more cautious approach to implementing REDD, given concerns that have been raised by civil society organisations and Indigenous Peoples. (As a result, Paraguay's earlier application to participate in the FCPF is on hold.)

The former, conservative Paraguayan government ardently supported profitable market mechanisms as a way to resolve environmental problems. This approach, combined with years of land grabs under the military dictatorship of General Alfredo Stroessner, had a cumulative impact on Paraguay's Indigenous Peoples and small farmers. These people have increasingly found themselves pushed off their lands and into destitution (GFC & Alter Vida, 2008). The former government's market-oriented approach was further entrenched in 2006, when Paraguay introduced its Act on the Valuation and Remuneration of Environmental Services (Act 3001/06, also referred to as Payment for Environmental Services or PES). This was done without adequate consultation with social movements, Indigenous Peoples or small farmers' organisations.

PES was intended to promote forest conservation by establishing a market for environmental services and compensating Paraguay's "landowners" for the environmental services their lands provided. It transpired that PES would be funded through "offset" payments from businesses whose activities have negative environmental impacts elsewhere in the country. PES even absolved landowners who had broken the existing forestry law by allowing them to compensate for illegal forest clearings by buying biodiversity offset certificates (forest conversion is formally prohibited in the eastern half of Paraguay) (GFC & AlterVida, 2008).

This PES "mindset" paved the way for REDD, which was welcomed with open arms. The former government initiated discussions with the FCPF, and later with the UN-REDD program, on a national REDD strategy. It again failed to consult Indigenous Peoples or local communities, preferring to work with a handful of large, mostly foreign, conservation organisations. The latter were consulted over the Readiness Project Information Note (R-PIN), which was submitted to the World Bank in July 2008.

The R-PIN did mention a "*network of Indigenous organizations*" that had been consulted, but there is no such network in Paraguay. In fact the main Indigenous Peoples' coalition, CAPI, had not been informed of the initiative at all. International indigenous observers to the FCPF, together with Friends of the Earth Paraguay / Sobrevivencia, alerted CAPI to the misinformation contained in the R-PIN. CAPI wrote a furious letter to the World Bank, which led to the FCPF process being halted. It remains suspended, with the World Bank's Dashboard summary commenting that: "*A delivery partner other than the WB may need to be identified*" (World Bank, 2010b).

Lugo's new government declared it would ensure Indigenous participation in the development of a new proposal with the UN, and invited CAPI to the technical team tasked with developing and implementing the REDD strategy. CAPI is now formally participating in the UN-REDD technical team for Paraguay, which has held several meetings and work sessions, but is not yet formally constituted (UN-REDD, 2010b).

Another Paraguayan REDD scheme that is ringing extremely loud alarm bells is the private Paraguay Forest Conservation Project, which has applied for certification from the Climate Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA). The project documents have been submitted by the conservation NGO Guyra Paraguay, Swire Pacific Offshore and the World Land Trust (CCBA, 2010). This project has also been strongly criticised by both Friends of the Earth Paraguay / Sobrevivencia and Paraguayan members of the Global Forest Coalition (GFC) for violating Paraguayan law on Indigenous rights and ignoring UNDRIP.

Furthermore, transnational company Swire Pacific Offshore (SPO, 2010) owns and operates vessels that support the offshore oil and gas industry. Parent company Swire Pacific's core businesses are in property, aviation, beverages, marine services, and trading and industrial activities. It is the largest shareholder of the Cathay Pacific airline, which boasts of flying over 24 million airline passengers a year (SPG, 2010). The company has a stated aim of becoming carbon neutral (CCBA, 2010). However, it is not clear whether it intends to sell or close any of its climate-damaging businesses.

This Paraguay Forest Conservation Project covers the area of La Amistad and the territory of the Ishir People in Upper Paraguay. It also affects the territories of, in particular, the Mbyá Guaraní people (in and around La Amistad, in the Eastern Region) and the Ayoreo People (in the Chaco-Pantanal). However, the project

five indigenous peoples and other forest-dependent communities struggle to be heard

continued

document submitted to the CCBA makes it eminently clear that the project managers have no intention of delaying the project to acquire the Free, Prior and Informed Consent of affected Indigenous Peoples. For example, they say: *“In practice, however, the Mbyá seek a full process of consultation and understanding of the concepts involved prior to any engagement, which does not fit the decision making schedule the project must adhere to. A similar situation has also delayed implementation of UN REDD-readiness initiatives”* (CCBA, 2010:28).

There has been no real process of consultation with these Indigenous Peoples. Those meetings that have been organised have been for information purposes only. In fact, the Union of Ayoreo Native People of Paraguay (UNAP), the Association of Indigenous Communities of Itapua, and CAPI explicitly rejected the project at a meeting in August 2009. Furthermore, the Mbyá Guaraní claim that the entire territory of San Rafael -including the area of La Amistad and the areas Guyra Paraguay claims are its property- is their *tekoha guasu* or “great homeland”, and this claim has been formally recognised by the Government of Paraguay (FoE Paraguay *et al.*, 2010). Similarly, the project area in the Chaco is subject to land claims by the Ayoreo. The project document clearly recognises that the main Ayoreo organisations have not given their consent to the project (CCBA, 2010:84). Yet it argues that the position of the Ayoreo People is not necessarily a “refusal”. In reality, however, an explicit rejection was made at a UNAP meeting in July 2009 (FoE Paraguay *et al.*, 2010).

The project also covers lands where Indigenous communities live in voluntary isolation, people whose land rights have yet

to be settled. The Constitution of Paraguay states that such territorial claims based on historical use should be respected. According to the UN Human Rights Council, UNDRIP also implies that one should restrain from implementing activities that impact on Indigenous Peoples living in voluntary isolation. As it is not possible to seek their consent, their decision to live in isolation should be interpreted as non-consent. The only explicit consent for the project has come from the Ishir People (one of the two Indigenous Peoples in Paraguay that are not members of CAPI). However, it is relevant to point out that this approval was the result of a consultation process of only one week.

Critically, and especially in the La Amistad area, land tenure is an unsettled issue. Similar problems with illegal and illegitimate land titles occur in the Chaco. There, more than 75% of the land titles are estimated to be legally incorrect, most of these concerning lands that were handed out or sold illegally under the former dictatorship. Implementing a PES scheme before these land claims are clarified could lead to serious and potentially violent conflicts between Indigenous Peoples and non-indigenous stakeholders, and possibly between Indigenous Peoples themselves (FoE Paraguay *et al.*, 2010).

Overall it is quite clear that this project is directly in conflict with CCBA’s standards as it is subject to an *“unresolved dispute over tenure and use rights to land or resources”* (CCBA, 2005). It is also in clear violation of the Paraguayan Constitution, UNDRIP and International Labour Organisation Convention 169 (FoE Paraguay *et al.*, 2010).

Source: Friends of the Earth Paraguay / Sobrevivencia

costa rica: national redd dialogue brooks no criticism

There is now a REDD consultation process underway in Costa Rica, funded by the World Bank FCPF. However, this process is heavily oriented toward those who favour a form of REDD funded by carbon markets. An initial document recognised the concerns expressed by the Indigenous sector and some environmental groups about linking REDD exclusively to global carbon markets (Gobierno de Costa Rica, 2010). However, Friends of the Earth Costa Rica / Coecoceiba explicitly stated its complete opposition to the inclusion of the REDD programme in carbon market mechanisms, and proposed analysing alternative approaches. This position was totally ignored in the final document. Following the Cochabamba World People’s Summit on Climate Change,

Indigenous Peoples also registered their opposition to the incorporation of Indigenous Territories in the carbon market.

FoE Costa Rica attended two meetings and was told that a third would be held before the initial draft of the R-PP was submitted to the World Bank. However, in July 2010 an internet search revealed that the document had not only been finalised but already presented to an international meeting. In short, it seems that the Costa Rican government has arranged consultations at the behest of, and funded by, the World Bank, but it is not willing to take on board any concerns or opposition registered during those meetings.

Source: Friends of the Earth Costa Rica / Coecoceiba

nigeria: rushing to implement redd in cross river state

Though neither a full participant of the FCPF nor UN-REDD, Nigeria is nonetheless clearly rushing to catch up with the crowd, and was accepted to both these bodies as an observer in March 2010. Its politicians are also engaged in the Governors' Climate and Forests Task Force.

The intention is to include one million hectares of tropical forest in the Cross River State in REDD+. The area contains over 50% of Nigeria's remaining tropical forest. It is home to 22 primate species including endemics like the Cross River Gorilla, and 75% of Nigeria's endangered tree species. Activities proposed include "*carbon, non-timber forest products, sustainable tree crops and ecotourism*" (Cross River State Presentation, 2010).

The Cross River State Government asserts that it held a Stakeholder Summit in June 2008, has put in place a two-year logging moratorium, and has established an anti-logging task force (Cross River State Presentation, 2010). It also mentions that there are "*valuable community forestry examples*".

It has also recognized challenges, and these are listed as: low REDD/PES awareness in government; low institutional capacity; no federal or state-level REDD carbon framework/legislation; uncertainty around land tenure and carbon rights; low budgets for environmental issues; and "*significant gaps in sustainable NTFP [Non Timber Forest Products] harvesting and marketing plans*" (Cross River State Presentation, 2010).

The local authority does say that it plans to build community engagement, and to involve civil society in the National REDD Steering Committee. The National Technical Committee on REDD+ was formally inaugurated in July 2010. It includes Chief Peter Ikwen (Community Forest Management, Cross River State), Surveyor Efik (Climate Change Network Nigeria) and

Priscila Achapa (Women Environmental Programme) (All Africa, 2010). However, there are serious concerns about the speed with which this committee is expected to work and whether it has any chance of fully engaging and listening to communities and civil society organisations more broadly. The Minister launching the Committee requested that it ensure that Nigeria is a full REDD+ participating country in just four months (All Africa, 2010). There seems to be little chance of any meaningful consultation at that speed.

REDD is already a concern to many in Nigeria who are extremely worried about its many potential social and environmental impacts. A range of civil society groups, including Friends of the Earth Nigeria / Environmental Rights Action, who gathered for a roundtable strategy and capacity-building meeting on REDD, held in Calabar, Nigeria on 18 August 2010, expressed their strong concerns in a communiqué.

They stress that Nigeria's forest-dependent poor risk being forcefully evicted from their land and denied access to the forests that underpin their culture and livelihoods. They are also concerned that forest-dependent communities have not been properly engaged or involved by government in the REDD negotiation process.

Furthermore, there are no known Environmental Impact Assessments on REDD-targeted forest communities in Nigeria. Awareness of REDD and its potential impacts is very low, including within government. There is also fear that the Nigerian government's interest in REDD stems from the huge funds involved, not its environmental and socio-cultural implications.

The signatories of the communiqué are also strongly opposed to linking REDD to carbon markets, and including plantations in REDD, since both also directly threaten the forest.²⁶

The other case studies in this report provide additional examples of organisations being excluded from national REDD consultations, seemingly because they have a critical approach to REDD and/or are concerned about its impacts. This has been reported, for example, by Friends of the Earth groups in Costa Rica and Liberia (see case studies) and Mozambique (Lemos, 2010).

Lack of consultation is a problem that has also been officially identified by the World Bank's Technical Advisory Panel (TAP), which is tasked with reviewing applications to the FCPF. In the case of Colombia, for example, the TAP review stated that, "*It is not apparent how the private sector or indigenous communities would have an immediate responsibility for the implementation of a REDD strategy and how they would be involved*", and that, "*No consultative processes have taken place yet*" (GFC, 2009:11). The TAP review of Panama's R-PIN also revealed a series of deficiencies and omissions, principally relating to the rights of Indigenous Peoples, which even conflicted with Panama's own constitution (GFC, 2009:64).

²⁶ For more information: www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO1008/S00467/dont-sell-forests-groups-urge-nigerian-govts.htm

six land tenure and other redd pitfalls

It seems clear that REDD is now in the design and development stage, even though it has not been agreed in the UNFCCC. As a result, the realities of negotiating and establishing REDD projects are becoming increasingly obvious. In particular, issues around land tenure and disagreements arising during negotiation -over who pays, who benefits, and decision-making processes- are emerging as key problems.

In Paraguay, for example, criticisms of the Paraguay Forest Conservation Project hinge on its failure to consider bitter and unresolved land tenure disputes (see Paraguay case study). Even projects that recognise and aim to address land tenure issues

may fail to do so. Academic assessments of the Ulu Masen Project in Indonesia, for example, argue that REDD poses a new risk to constitutional and legislative provisions protecting customary rights in Indonesia (see Ulu Masen case study).

The existing culture that prevails in a country is likely to determine the real extent to which REDD may lead to conflict over land rights. Even where new community rights are formally introduced, as in Liberia, for example, communities' land rights may continue to be treated "*as if they did not exist*" in practice. This does not bode well for the prospect of communities supposed to benefit from REDD (see Liberia case study).

brazil: guaraqueçaba's impacts on indigenous communities

The Guaraqueçaba project in southeastern Brazil was set up just over 10 years ago, to combat global warming by sequestering CO₂.²⁷ It is made up of three carbon projects: the Morro da Mina, Rio Cachoeira and Serra do Itaqui reserves. It was established by The Nature Conservancy, and the Sociedade de Pesquisa em Vida Selvagem e Educação Ambiental, with financial support from General Motors, Chevron Texaco and American Electric Power.

The traditional inhabitants of these territories now face limitations on their movements in their own lands, and many have moved to live in poverty in nearby towns. Some have faced imprisonment for using wood for traditional uses (housing); and others report intimidation by the project's armed park rangers when collecting food (Lang, 2009).

Carlos Machado, Mayor of nearby Antonina, had this to say: "*Antonina is a small town that has few resources for generating income, few possibilities for people who come from the rural zone without skills and without the defenses to live in the urban environment. They stay in the outskirts of town, in the mangrove swamps, in irregular, inhospitable situations. It creates a lot of social problems for us. ... Families have been torn apart by prostitution, drugs and alcoholism. Directly or indirectly it was through these conservation projects that the population came here and created a ring of poverty around our city causing a really big social problem here*" (Interview with Mark Schapiro; Lang, 2009).

Source: Friends of the Earth Colombia / CENSAT Agua Viva & REDD Monitor



Deforestation, Brazil: 60-70% of deforestation in the Amazon is caused by cattle ranching and soya cultivation.

27 For more information: www.nature.org/initiatives/climatechange/work/art4254.html

redd in liberia: opening a new frontier in the struggle for community rights

The REDD process is opening up a whole new front in the ongoing struggle to advance community rights in Liberia's forest sector. Liberia holds approximately one third of the remaining Upper Guinea forests of West Africa and is currently developing an R-PP to submit to the World Bank's FCPF in October 2010.

This process has been accompanied by rhetoric about community rights and meaningful participation from the government and its allies, Conservation International (CI) and Fauna and Flora International (FFI). Forest peoples will undoubtedly be most affected by REDD, yet local communities are being excluded from Liberia's REDD dialogue, much of which has so far taken place at the national level. CI and FFI, on the other hand, are driving the process, hiring and paying experts who have a privileged place at the negotiating table. They are also implementing or funding projects designed to reinforce the notion that carbon markets are the answer to forest loss and could increase income for the national government. They do not speak of critical challenges including poor forest governance or potential problems that could emerge from poor policy development and implementation on the ground.

Forest governance is extremely weak in Liberia. There is little respect for the rule of law.²⁸ This situation has not been resolved despite a new forestry law,²⁹ forestry regulations³⁰ and a community rights law³¹ specifically intended to protect the rights of local communities and to define how communities should be involved in decision-making processes. The land rights of communities are treated as if they did not exist. In other sectors, such as mining, revenue redistribution arrangements intended to fund community development and to fulfil revenue sharing obligations have been hijacked by political elites.³² The government pays lip service to community rights in the natural resource sector. In light of this experience there is very little reason to think that any potential REDD revenue would be treated differently.

Even more worrying is the fact that the blame for deforestation is mostly being laid at the doorstep of forest communities. The possibility that future REDD policies and implementation strategies could unfairly target forest communities and push them further to the margins of society is high. Losing this struggle for community rights is not an option however, opening a new frontier has just made winning harder.

Source: Friends of the Earth Liberia / Sustainable Development Institute

- 28 Sustainable Development Institute (2010). Liberia: the promise betrayed http://www.fern.org/Liberia_promise_betrayed
- 29 The National Forestry Reform Law (2006): www.fda.gov.lr/doc/finalforestrylawPASSEDBYLEGSLATURE.pdf
- 30 Regulation 101-07 on Public Participation: www.fda.gov.lr/doc/FDATENCOREREGULATIONS.pdf
- 31 Community Rights Law with Respect to Forest Lands: www.fda.gov.lr/doc/Liberia%20Forestry%20-%20CRL%20October%202009%20-%20official.pdf
- 32 FoE Europe and Liberia (2010). Working for Development: ArcelorMittal's mining operations in Liberia. <http://www.foei.org/en/resources/publications/pdfs/2010/working-for-development-arcelormittal2019s-mining-operations-in-liberia/view>



Foreground: Clear cut logging of eucalyptus plantation. Background: Pine tree and eucalyptus plantations, and 'extraction' roads opened in native forest. Mawuidanche mountain range, municipality of Loncoche, Southern Chile

seven leakage and plantations – the killer issues?

Ultimately, the killer issue for REDD will probably be whether it actually reduces greenhouse gas emissions or not (whereas the killer issue for the planet may be how long governments are prepared to wait to determine the answer). Because of the high risk of “leakage” – that is, the situation whereby demand for forest and agricultural products stays high, and deforestation continues as result, but simply shifts in location – it is possible that REDD will fail to deliver the expected emissions reductions.

There is thus a debate about whether REDD can only be delivered effectively at the national level. This is partly because of leakage from (“sub-national”) REDD projects, and partly because carbon is also absorbed and stored by non-forest ecosystems which also require protection. However, this could be used to justify paying *all* those engaged in forest-damaging activities, whether they are communities and subsistence farmers struggling to sustain livelihoods, or logging and palm oil companies anxious to tap into a convenient new income stream. This expanded approach is fraught with complexity because of the ethical and practical difficulties involved.

Ulu Masen in Indonesia is a much-studied example. Although there is a local moratorium on logging in Aceh, academics argue the likelihood of leakage is higher than that predicted by the project’s proponents. Some research reports now argue that although the Ulu Masen project may have some value in itself (primarily as a means of conserving a highly biodiverse tropical

forest ecosystem) it may have no impact on Indonesia’s overall greenhouse gas emissions. This seems to be an overarching dilemma for REDD – as long as nothing is done to address demand for timber and agricultural commodities, the products will come from somewhere.

“New data from Indonesia suggests that one-third of greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation originate from areas not officially defined as ‘forest’, and that leakage into these areas means that ... If carbon emissions from outside the institutional forest are accounted for, it becomes clear that there are no net emission reductions in Indonesia” (emphasis added) (ASB, 2010).

A further problem is whether REDD’s operational principles allow plantations to be included as forests (in part to facilitate a “national level” approach). Indonesia, for example, is reported to be looking at the “feasibility” of including oil palm within REDD (Reuters, 2010c).

If so, this could lead to the replacement of old-growth forests that sequester more than five times as much carbon as plantations (Palm *et al.*, 1999) with tree monocultures likely to be harvested in the not-too-distant future. Intense lobbying from the plantation industry means that this remains very much on the cards in the UNFCCC negotiations. The introduction of REDD legislation endorsing “sustainable forest management” in countries such as Indonesia may also prejudice the outcome.

indonesia: leakage and the ulu masen ecosystem project, aceh

As the most advanced voluntary initiative currently operating in Indonesia, the Ulu Masen Ecosystem Project in Aceh province provides a useful case study when it comes to examining what REDD really means in practice. The project has adopted a much-publicised participatory approach. However, practice seems to have lagged some way behind theory. Proper community consultation and involvement in the design and implementation of the project have been skipped, seemingly in order to move the project along as quickly as possible. In addition there are clearly tensions between the different parties involved, including national and regional government and the private sector. Furthermore, it seems that Ulu Masen may be used to

begin implementing a form of REDD+ that includes payments to plantation companies in Indonesia, and to justify the same outcome elsewhere.

The Ulu Masen ecosystem is rich in biodiversity and provides water for two million people. However, its forests are also home to high-value tropical hardwood trees including *semaram*, *merbau*, *kruing* and *meranti*. Its soils hide a wealth of coal and mineral resources, including gold, copper and iron ore. Deforestation in Aceh is primarily driven by logging, conversion for roads and infrastructure, and plantations of oil palm and rubber trees (CCBA, 2007:20).

continued

In July 2008, Carbon Conservation, an Australian carbon trading company, signed an agreement with the Government of Aceh to protect up to 750,000 hectares of forest in the Ulu Masen Ecosystem in northern Aceh. This two-stage project is intended to qualify for REDD credits after 2012. In the meantime the project aims to sell credits on the voluntary markets (CCBA, 2007:40).

The Ulu Masen project is also supported by Flora and Fauna International, and the US Bank of America's Merrill Lynch has agreed to invest US\$9 million in it. The project's proponents state that it will reduce deforestation by 85% (CCBA, 2007:40) and that it aims to generate up to US\$432 million over the next 30 years (Asian Green Governors' Roundtable, 2009).

According to the Sales and Marketing agreement signed in July 2008, 30% of the credits generated will be set aside as a "Risk Management Buffer" (to account for concerns over permanence and leakage) and the remaining 70% sold. After payment of a fee to an appointed "collection agent" who manages the money, 15% of the remaining funds will go to Carbon Conservation as a marketing fee and 85% to the project account, which will be distributed to local communities (Ulu Masen Ecosystem Project Sales and Marketing Agreement, 2008).

Approximately 130,000 people live in and immediately adjacent to the Ulu Masen project area, and an estimated 61 *mukims* (villages) will be affected by the project. However, as the project documents explain, although most of the project site is designated national forest land (*hutan negara*) there is considerable potential for conflict over land if communities are not properly involved. This is because the local communities already regard adjacent forest lands as traditional/customary lands (CCBA, 2007:14).

The project, which has been designed with all this in mind, claims it will contribute to sustainable economic and social development and biodiversity conservation. Zones previously allocated for logging will be reclassified as protected forests or community-managed low-impact limited production areas; and the project will be monitored and enforced. Overall, the Government of Aceh aims to restructure forestry law and practices in the region, and involve the local communities in making land-use decisions, including on jointly agreed boundaries and land use patterns. It plans to develop a multi-stakeholder management structure (Anderson & Kuswardono 2008:13). The project also claims it will use a participatory and transparent benefit-sharing process (CCBA, 2007:56).

The government claims that Ulu Masen is now well advanced. It says it has initiated consultation processes with *mukim* leaders, established and trained rangers, supported participatory land use planning, developed and distributed information about REDD, and set up a REDD taskforce. Language on both Free, Prior and Informed Consent and fund distribution is strong, and project reports state that extensive community consultations were conducted prior to the agreement's signing. Planned next steps apparently include designing "*mechanisms for improving tenure security for forest edge communities*" and developing "*fair, equitable and transparent REDD incentive payments.*" (GoA, 2010)

However, it seems the communities concerned may not view the project in quite as positive a light. One questions how many of the local communities really knew what was being signed on their behalf and whether they are fully aware of how the profits will be distributed. Furthermore, at the Governors' Climate and Forests Task Force meeting with stakeholders in Banda Aceh, in May 2010, the Aceh Civil Society Forum for Sovereignty of the Mukim released a press statement asserting that the principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent had been violated: in their view REDD is developing into another "*elite initiative*" (McCulloch, 2010).

Academic assessments of the Ulu Masen Project are equally damning. They conclude that community consultation and involvement has been patchy at best, and that REDD poses a new risk to community land rights.

One such assessment observes that full community consultation in Ulu Masen has been sacrificed in order to move the project on as quickly as possible: "*The rapid implementation of the Project and push to demonstrate results have resulted in significant trade-offs in terms of community consent and participation. While project proponents may counter by pointing to the 'rolling' nature of project start-up, whereby existing government and aid initiatives set the foundation for the REDD framework, key decisions and arrangements were made without full community consent ... Community consultation is planned as the project unfolds, however no free, prior and informed consent was sought*" (Clarke, 2010).

Another observes that, "*the national interest, a vague notion of development and the state's right of control enshrined in various laws and regulations relating to land and forests -including a recent REDD Regulation- have subordinated constitutional and legislative provisions protecting customary (adat) rights in Indonesia*" (Dunlop, 2009).

seven leakage and plantations – the killer issues?

continued

There are also concerns about how disputes and conflict might be managed. Conflicts amongst and within communities benefiting from the project are likely to be a problem, especially between those who have acknowledged customary tenure and those that do not. There are also concerns about enforcement, in particular whether armed guards will be employed to protect the Ulu Masen forests (ABC, 2008).

In addition there are also worries about how equitable the distribution of REDD funds will be in practice, with just one community representative (to be nominated by the Governor of Aceh) on the Steering Committee, to speak for all 61 local *mukims*.

Leakage from the Ulu Masen project is also emerging as a critical issue. The project documentation recognises the potential for leakage, but estimates it at just 10%. It claims that the “risk management buffer”, together with sustainable community forest management, including possible timber production, will be sufficient to address such leakage (CCBA, 2007:53). It is true that the moratorium on logging enacted in 2007 by the Government of Aceh does mean that state-driven leakage is unlikely to occur within the project area. However, there is still a very strong likelihood of increased logging in the neighbouring North Sumatra province, or illegal logging outside the project area. As one researcher has commented, “REDD Projects cannot address the broader forces driving deforestation in the wider landscape because they operate at smaller scales. In turn, there is a high risk of leakage” (REDD Monitor, 2010b).

In fact the whole debate around REDD in Indonesia seems to be rapidly shifting to consideration of whether a whole-of-landscape approach should be used. The same paper argues strongly for a “landscape level conservation approach” on the basis that the “[Ulu Masen] initiative will not significantly reduce deforestation in northern Sumatra and will have little impact on orang-utan conservation, because firstly a large amount of forest inside the proposed REDD project area is protected de facto by being inaccessible; and secondly much of northern Sumatra’s lowland forests will remain outside of REDD and will be exposed to the combined expansion of high-revenue oil palm plantations and road networks.” (Gaveau et al., 2010)

The report goes on to argue that, “The landscape level conservation approach presented in the ERL [Environmental Research Letters] paper puts a halt to road and oil palm development outside recognized protected areas through direct compensation to land holders like companies and small-scale farmers. This approach also deals with leakage by securing a conservation deal across all remaining forests in the province”

(emphasis added) (Gaveau et al., 2010). At the same time, however, it recognises the complexities inherent in this broader approach. It states, “Identifying who should receive compensation as well as negotiating transparent and effective payment arrangements, is at best challenging especially with ambiguous land use rights and government jurisdiction in Indonesia.” It observes, “Perhaps, a fatal flaw in the potential implementation of the landscape conservation approach is that carbon offset prices may have trouble competing with prices of agricultural commodities, for example palm oil. Demand for agricultural products won’t go away” (Gaveau et al., 2010).

It seems that a shift from project-based REDD to landscape-level REDD might already be underway in Indonesia. For example, the Indonesian government has already explicitly incorporated “sustainable forest management” (which can include plantations) in its national regulations on REDD, in advance of any such agreement being reached in the UNFCCC (GFC, 2009). A recent governmental update on Ulu Masen also refers to an “Interim sub-national approach within emerging national norms and standards” (GoA, 2010).

There is also a risk that REDD funds generated by the Ulu Masen project (including any generated through reforestation/plantations in the first place) will themselves be reinvested in and further drive the production of agrofuels (CCBA, 2007:42).

It is essential that the Ulu Masen project continues to be monitored closely as it develops. This project’s implementation will have huge implications not only for the affected Indigenous Peoples, but also for Indigenous forest-dependent peoples throughout Indonesia.

Source: Friends of the Earth Indonesia / WALHI



Logging, Indonesia

eight redd and carbon trading | conclusions

“REDD is the most mind twistingly complex endeavor in the carbon game. The fact is that REDD involves scientific uncertainties, technical challenges, heterogeneous non-contiguous asset classes, multi-decade performance guarantees, local land tenure issues, brutal potential for gaming and the fact that getting it wrong means that scam artists will get unimaginably rich while emissions don’t change a bit” (Stuart, 2009)

It is vital that REDD is not linked to carbon markets, for a number of different reasons.

To start with, carbon trading is not working anyway. It is not delivering the urgent cuts in emissions needed to prevent catastrophic climate change. It is failing to realise promised incentives for investment in new low-carbon technology. And it is a dangerously unstrategic approach for making the transition to a low-carbon economy.

Carbon trading schemes also rely on offsetting, a controversial, ineffective and increasingly discredited mechanism. Combined with REDD they would provide a smokescreen for rich, developed countries’ failure to provide developing countries with promised support to tackle climate change.

conclusions

Even though the design of REDD has yet to be agreed in the UNFCCC, a REDD race is firmly underway, with investors, including banks, energy companies and carbon traders fully engaged in seeking out profitable opportunities.

This raises the unpalatable possibility that government negotiators will simply agree to a form of REDD that encompasses existing REDD projects. On the other hand, it also means that governments have a fleeting opportunity to examine the potential impacts of what they are about to agree to in advance, with a view to building truly effective and equitable alternative mechanisms that can actually stop deforestation, unlike the REDD proposals currently being put forward, which include plantations and carbon market funding sources. Some governments already support this approach, although they remain a minority. Yet it is essential that the voices of these governments, and the outcomes of the 2010 World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth in Cochabamba, be heard.³⁴

The solutions to mitigating and adapting to climate change cannot be based on tools that stop real solutions to fighting climate change, and displace Indigenous Peoples from their ancestral territories. Neither should they constitute a fast “green” route to riches for banks and dirty fossil fuel companies

In addition, the price of carbon, as with any other commodity, is volatile and largely unpredictable. Carbon trading risks a repetition of the subprime mortgage crisis. It would be highly undesirable to have the future of REDD, or any other system designed to mitigate climate change, dependent upon whether the price of carbon could outcompete the price of other commodities such as palm oil.³³

Yet it seems that many REDD projects are being set up specifically with a view to making a handsome profit from carbon trading when REDD is agreed in the UNFCCC. (This is based on the understanding that the price of REDD credits will increase significantly in comparison to the price they fetch on voluntary carbon markets). Ulu Masen in Indonesia is a case in point. The Government of Indonesia also seems to have prejudged the outcome of the UNFCCC negotiations by enacting national REDD-implementing legislation that incorporates both “sustainable forest management” (which includes plantations) and allows for the selling of credits on carbon markets (GFC, 2009).

seeking to improve their environmental credentials. There are many other ways in which mechanisms to reduce deforestation could be implemented, including through investment in national programmes and infrastructure that directly support alternative, rights-based forms of forest conservation, natural restoration and ecosystem restoration.

Essential elements in any new approach to stopping deforestation are: reducing demand for agricultural and timber commodities; reviewing the definition of forests to ensure that plantations are excluded; and making sure that any such scheme, in so far as it requires financing, excludes any rewards for climate polluters, and is based on public funding and repayment of the carbon debt. Such a mechanism should reward those who have already conserved their forests. It should build on the experiences of Indigenous Peoples around the world who already know how to manage and benefit from forests sustainably, and whose rights are recognised by UNDRIP. There are many lessons waiting to be learned.

The end goal is mitigating climate change, after all, not making money. Governments have been tasked with creating low-carbon economies, not new carbon markets.

³³ To read two more detailed critiques of carbon trading, visit: www.foe.co.uk/news/carbon_trading_21807.html and www.foe.org/pdf/SubprimeCarbonReport.pdf.

³⁴ To read the outcomes from Cochabamba go to: pwccc.wordpress.com.

glossary & references

The UNFCCC glossary is available here:

unfccc.int/essential_background/glossary/items/3666.php

A useful list of REDD-related terms and acronyms can be found here:

Pocket Guide. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD): A Guide for Indigenous Peoples

www.ias.unu.edu/redirect_UNU.aspx?ddlID=731&catID=732

AGF High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing

AWG-KP Ad Hoc Working Group on Kyoto Protocol

AWG-LCA Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action

CAPI Coordinadora para la Autonomía de Pueblos Indígenas

CCBA Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance

COMIFAC Central African Forests Commission

COP Conference of the Parties

FCPF Forest Carbon Partnership Facility

FIP Forest Investment Programme

FOE Friends of the Earth

FOEI Friends of the Earth International

FSC Forest Stewardship Council

GFC Global Forest Coalition

ITTO International Tropical Timber Organization

LULUCF Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry

NGO Non-governmental Organisation

OP Operational Policy (of the World Bank)

PES Payments for Ecosystem Services

REDD Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries

R-PIN Readiness Project Information Note (FCPF)

R-PP Readiness Plan for REDD (FCPF)

SFM Sustainable Forest Management

TAP Technical Advisory Panel

UNAP Union of Ayoreo Native People of Paraguay

UNDRIP United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UN-REDD United Nations Collaborative Programme on REDD

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